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ABSTRACT. 
Natural protected areas are a resource for, and in which, a wide range of 
values is identified; market value, non-market value, and intrinsic value. 
National park history, philosophy and legislation is interpreted to suggest that 
preservation is, ideally, the primary land management goal for national parks, 
and that this goal reflects a subset of the values identified for protected areas 
as a whole. In actuality though, there are a number of non-preservationist 
influences which may increasingly prevent preservationist objectives from 
being met. These influences reflect a different subset of protected area 
values. In order for preservation to be achieved, stricter legislation will be 
necessary and in many cases it will not be applicable to existing national 
parks. It will be necessary to identify the areas where preservation is still 
achievable, and to protect those areas under the new legislation. The 
preservation of land will then require clear understanding of the values 
underlying preservation, and strong advocacy of those values in the face of 
pervasive human modifying influences. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION. 
On looking at most landscapes of New Zealand, the impacts of human 
settlement are obvious, to varying degrees. These parts of the landscape 
have generally being modified, either for productive purposes or for human 
dwellings. However, some parts of the landscape remain similar in character 
to their pre-European and even pre-Polynesian state. Many of these 
essentially unmodified areas are becoming increasingly valuable as 
storehouses of genetic diversity, protectors of productive soils, generators of 
tourism revenue, and as retreats from life in the modified areas of New 
Zealand, especially the cities. To protect these values of unmodified 
environments, New Zealand has an extensive and well developed natural 
protected area system, including 12 'national parks'. 
However there are a number of changes occuring to resource allocation 
philosophy and procedures in New Zealand which could affect national 
parks. In addition tourism, much of it oriented towards outdoor activities, is 
rapidly increasing in New Zealand. This also has possible implications for 
national parks. It also seems that, although national parks are all managed 
under ' the same legislation, and by the same department, there is a vast 
difference in the physical expression of peoples' influences in those parks. 
These concerns, the author's own observation of national parks in New 
Zealand, and the concerns evident in recent conservationist literature, have 
provided the impetus for conducting this investigation. 
This project is concerned with whether or not national parks in New 
Zealand are being managed according to the goals expressed in their 
legislation, as derived in turn from their history and philosophy. It seeks to 
compare national parks ideally with national parks in actuality or expected 
actuality, and address the implications of any difference between ideal and 
actual outcomes. The central assumption of this project then, is that if land is 
designated with any status, the purpose of that designation, and its 
underlying values should be met. 
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Chapter Two identifies the range of values associated with protected 
areas as a whole. It investigates market, non-market and intrinsic values, 
drawing mainly on economic and philosophical literature. 
The Third chapter proposes an ideal management goal for national 
parks in New Zealand, as an expression of park history, philosophy and 
legislation. In turn this goal will be matched to the range of values in Chapter 
Two. 
Chapter Four examines any influences that currently are, or potentially 
may, prevent the achievment of the ideal management goal proposed in 
Chapter Three. It will determine what sort of management goal is actually 
being achieved, or is likely to be achieved and will again match that to the 
range of values from Chapter Two. 
Chapter Five will assess the implications of any difference between the 
management goals, and underlying values, that Chapters Three and Four 
find existing in, or potentially existing in, national parks. It will also suggest 
possible solutions to any failure of the stewardship of New Zealand's national 
parks to meet its proposed, ideal goal. 
It is not the purpose of this project to provide definitive answers to 
national park problems. Indeed the very existence of the problem studied 
could be disputed. Instead this project is intended to alert park managers and 
administrators to a possible, or potential problem in the achievement of their 
objectives as land managers. Accordingly, it outlines possible solutions 
which are intended to ensure the achievement of those goals. The success of 
this project is not contingent upon its acceptance by national park managers. 
It will be successful simply if it promotes careful discussion of national parks 
in terms of the management goals they are intended to reflect. 
CHAPTER 2. VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH PROTECTED 
AREAS. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION. 
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Upon investigating resource management issues it is found that the cause of 
any conflict that exists may be differences in peoples' values. Individuals and 
groups of individuals within society value nature and natural resources 
differently, and often prefer different courses of action with respect to those 
resources. For instance, some people and groups would prefer certain 
resource developments to occur while others would not. Indeed there is a 
wide range of values that may possibly exist in, or be held for, or granted to 
nature and natural resources. Resource managers must consider these in 
their decision-making, and resource management could be characterised as 
the resolution of value-based conflict among humans. 
If values are important in resource management problems and conflicts, 
it seems reasonable to begin an assessment of such a problem with an 
assessment of values. National parks are a subset of protected areas, which 
are an example of a resource with which a broad range of values might be 
associated. "It is only when values are considered in relation to one another 
that their nature and shortcomings become known" (Brown 1984, 231). 
Similarly it is only when national parks are considered in relation to other 
protected areas that the values appropriate to national parks can be 
established. 
Values associated with protected areas may be classified as market, 
non-market and intrinsic. They are examined in detail below: 
• 
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2.2. MARKET VALUES IN PROTECTED AREAS. 
A demand for a product exists because that product may provide utility or 
satisfaction, and is affordable relative to other products (Wonnacott and 
Wonnacott 1979, 395). A supply of a product exists because that supply is 
marketable, again relative to other products, and because it represents an 
income to a supplier. The existence of demand and supply leads to the 
interaction of willing producers and consumers. In a capitalist economy this 
interaction occurs within a market; the arena in which buyers and sellers 
interact and goods and services are traded for prices, or market values. 
Value is seen in neoclassical economics as being preference related, 
and derived from individual human beings (Browl) 1984, 231). Market values 
are d.erived from the collective interactions of individual producers and 
consumers in markets, and reflect the scarcity of resources of both producers 
and consumers, and the worth of goods relative to each other. Brown sees 
market value as either a unit or an aggregate concept (1984, 239). As a unit 
concept, market values are the prices that participants in markets pay and 
accept for products. Market price is delineated in units of money to allow 
efficient exchange to occur. As an aggregate concept, it is the sum of the 
surplus to consumers over and above the prices they pay and the surplus to 
producers over and above their supply costs. In this sense it is the utility 
gained by the participants in a market transaction, and more utility is gained 
by more transactions. While these two aspects of the market phenomenon 
are recognised, they are taken here as occuring simultaneously. 
Market values are useful for public decision-makers because they exist 
for a large number of goods, and can indicate the relative importance of many 
things, to many people. They are easily observed, and as social phenomena 
they reflect the interaction of many individuals, not just a few. Boulding, who 
saw a clear measure of value as essential in order to establish whether today 
is better than yesterday (1977, 819), called money, "the only mechanism 
which offers a clear measure of value in our society" (1977, 819). 
Market values also have "a kind of objective status" (Boulding 1977, 
F 
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820), and both they, and the market mechanism have considerable 
"normative clout" (Boulding 1977, 820). For instance, the current government 
openly advocates a 'more market' approach to New Zealand's economic 
problems, and the fostering and encouraging of market activity is often seen 
as maximising individual freedom and opportunities, and collective wealth 
(see for example Friedman 1962; Treasury 1984). Indeed, dollar values are 
used to indicate national wealth, or 'standard of living', in the form of Gross 
Domestic Product (per capita). 
The appropriateness of market values as an indicator of value depends 
upon the acceptance of the values and assumptions underlying market 
decisions, the notion of what constitutes social welfare, and how well the 
market mechanism contributes to that welfare. With respect to public 
resources, market values "are often inappropriate as the sole value measure" 
(Brown 1984, 231). Prices may not reflect all of the values placed on all parts 
of public resources, and therefore decisions based upon price alone may 
destroy some of those values. 
One such example of a public resource is the protected area resource. 
While the minerals, some of the land, and some of the trees in protected 
areas have market values, "most members of the land community have no 
economic [market] value" (Leopold 1949, 225). Instead protected areas 
contain many other values and provide non-market benefits. Indeed, some 
protected areas may be an example of something which "we ... have a feeling 
somehow ... should be priceless" (Boulding 1977, 820-21). 
Protected areas are not themselves marketed commodities, but the land, 
and flora and fauna they contain, may contribute to income and national 
wealth in two ways: Firstly, as protected areas they involve people in market 
transactions; people pay to get to protected areas, and for the food and 
equipment they use there. They may also consume services such as 
publications or guided activities. In this case protected areas provide income 
but are not greatly modified; the actual market values of some of the park's 
resources are not realised. Secondly, a protected area may have its status 
revoked and the marketable resources within it developed. The potential 
F 
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market value of a protected area's resources then is an opportunity cost of 
having those resources protected. 
If the market mechanism is used in a society as the sole determinant for 
land and resource decision-making, then decisions will emphasise the land 
uses which are the most productive in terms of market value. Protected areas 
would then have to be shown to be the most productive use for the land they 
include. This seems difficult given that much of their value is not traded in 
markets, or present in conventional calculations of social wealth. It may also 
be inappropriate given that incorporating productive values into them may 
affect their other values, and these other values are considered important by 
some people. 
Market value seems inappropriate as the sole measure of the value of 
protected areas. Firstly, it does not reflect all of the values present in, or held 
for protected areas. Secondly, strict adherence to market signals in protected 
areas might see them changed drastically in order to remain favoured over 
competing land uses, or might actually see their status revoked and their 
resources 'cashed in'. In order to appreciate the full value of protected areas, 
there is a need for the other values associated with protected areas to 
understood: 
2.3. NON-MARKET VALUES IN PROTECTED AREAS. 
There is little debate over whether or not we should have protected natural 
areas. Instead we consider how many, of what size and status, and in what 
areas (Loomis and Walsh 1986, 130; Peterson and Randall 1986). In such 
decision-making, information is needed on "the relative benefits of the 
choices available" (Everitt 1983, 176-77), because resources are scarce, and 
may be used in a variety of ways. While "the benefit of ... market activities can 
be eloquently shown (Everitt 1983, 177), many of the benefits from protected 
areas are intangible. Being of a public good nature, these benefits are not 
expressed explicitly in markets, and may even conflict with desirable market 
outcomes. 
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Non-market valuation has arisen from within the discipline of economics, 
reflecting several concerns with existing decision criteria. On one hand there 
has been the concern that there is no such thing as the value of an object 
(Brown 1984, 244). and that the market value of some things was probably 
not the same as their true total value. On the other hand there is the concern 
that market and non~market values are incommensurable and "a set of social 
valuation coefficients [is needed] which can transform heterogeneous items 
into a common measure of value" (Boulding 1977, 811). This is coupled with 
concern that objectively derived values of extra-market benefits are needed 
so as not to "reflect the biases of the valuers" (Everitt 1983, 176). 
While non-market values are not observed in markets, they are 
economic; "values are economic if some individuals (not necessarily all) feel 
better off (not necessarily materially) from receiving them" (Loomis and Walsh 
1986, 126). While neither markets and prices, nor consumption or use need 
exist for economic value to exist (Edwards 1987, 79), non-market valuation is 
utilitarian (Peterson and Randall 1984, 4; Edwards 1987, 79). Its most basic 
assumption is that the "individual human being is ... the originator of 
preference and, therefore of value" (Brown 1984, 231). Like conventional 
economic analysis it assumes that "the ultimate aim of economic activity is to 
satisfy the preference of consumers (Ulph and Reynolds 1981, 17). 
Indeed, non-market valuation is usually done in hypothetical markets 
because; 
"although there are no actual prices to reflect what people are 
willing to pay for non-marketed goods, there is no reason why 
we cannot ask then what they would be willing to pay under 
some hypothetical equivalent of market trading" 
(Ulph and Reynolds 1981, 17, italics added). 
Benefit-cost analysis seeks to simulate "complete and efficient" markets 
(Peterson and Randall 1984, 7), and is concerned with the "overall level of 
economic well-being" (Bishop and Heberlein 1979, 929), just as market 
analysis is. Indeed, the growth of the field of non-market valuation could 
actually be seen as part of the previously noted growth of market forces 
generally, because the latter is bringing increased pressure upon land 
I 
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managers, and others, to justify their activities "in terms of economic benefits 
and costs" (Peterson and Randall 1984, 2). 
The essential difference between market and non-market valuation then, 
is that the latter has a wider definition of value, including not just market 
value, but also recreation, scientific, educational, cultural, historic, aesthetic, 
option, existence and quasi-option values. Non-market valuation recognises 
that market value is not always equal to total value and sets about eliciting 
and measuring the difference. 
The non-market valuation field has not been without its critics. Some 
people will not accept the normative basis of cost benefit analysis, and, or the 
empirical methods. They believe it has "a long way to go before it can claim 
accuracy comparable to analyses of market phenomena" (Bishop and 
Heberlein 1979, 929). Meanwhile, others, mainly ethicists and ecologists 
have criticised the "monetisation of environmental values ... for being 
imperialistic, reductionistic, illogical, irrelevant and innappropriate" (Edwards 
1987, 73). Some of the latter critics believe that there is also intrinsic value in 
nature which exists whether or not it gives people utility. These values cannot 
be accounted for by even non-market analysis because of its fundamental 
assumption that value can only inhere in humans. They are discussed below: 
2.4. INTRINSIC VALUES IN PROTECTED AREAS. 
Intrinsic value is the most problematic type of value associated with protected 
areas because it must exist independently of humans and their valuing 
consciousness. Its existence is therefore very difficult, if not impossible to 
prove or disprove. Callicott describes "the problem of constructing an 
adequate theory of intrinsic value for non-human natural entities and for 
nature as a whole" as "the central and most recalcitrant problem facing 
environmental ethics" (1985, 257). 
Because readily quantified values are more easily understood and 
accepted than intangible ones, and because the two sorts of value are 
incommensurable, it is difficult, perhaps impossible to "judge the propriety of 
,. 
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appealing to ... [intangible values] in the defence of social policy" (Hammond 
1985, 168). Despite this difficulty though, Singer and others find that "ethics 
is inescapable, ... it [is] impossible to prevent ourselves ... classifying actions as 
right or wrong" (1981, ix). The objectivity of ethics though, must be 
questioned; "are moral laws somehow part of the nature of the universe, like 
the laws of physics? .. or must ethics always be relative to the society in which 
we live, perhaps even to the personal attitudes of each of us" (ibid, ix). 
Unlike our scientific enquiries into the nature of the physical universe, 
moral philosophy has revealed few generally accepted results about the 
fundamental nature of ethics, or the world. Adams (1972, 3) attributes this to 
the fact that the principle knowledge humans seek is "how can I impose my 
will upon the world and exploit it for my own purpose?". He believes that 
people will not accept any objective, normative aspects of nature because 
that belief will attenuate their power. However "heritage [and other intangible] 
values are as legitimate and important as any other values commonly 
appealed to in the justification of action and policy" (Hammond 1985, 168). 
For instance, the 1980 National Parks Act, unlike its 1952 predecessor, 
specifies the "intrinsic worth" (s.4) of parks as a reason for their "preservation", 
and not just "the benefit, use and enjoyment of the public" (National Parks Act 
1980, s.4). 
Many authors have tried to establish a credible basis for a theory of 
intrinsic value in nature. Progress has been made but intrinsic value theory is 
yet to be accepted axiomatically. It is not a cultural impossibility; spirit and 
independent qualities have been held to exist intrinsically in nature in many 
pre-industrial and pre-Christianic societies, including Maori society. The 
problem with getting acceptance for a theory of intrinsic value is one of 
overcoming the existing, entrenched cultural attitude that; "things which have 
been held to be intrinsically valuable, within our Western tradition of thought, 
have nearly always been taken to be states or conditions of persons" 
(Godfrey-Smith 1979, 309/10). "It follows from this that a very central 
assumption of Western moral thought is that value can be ascribed to the 
nonhuman world only insofar as it is good for the sake of the well-being of 
f 
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human beings" (ibid, 310). 
To 'qualify' as intrinsic, value must be self sufficient in the valuable 
object. Callicott suggests that something might be said to possess intrinsic 
value "if its value is objective and independent of all valuing consciousness" 
(Callicott 1980, 262). Because of the impossibility of proving the existence of 
such value he proposes another type pf value which he calls inherent value. 
This equates to the assigned, and therefore possibly measurable part of 
intrinsic value. 
"Let something be said, to posses inherent value if (while its 
value is not independent of all valuing consciousness) it is 
valued for itself and not only because it serves as a means to 
satisfy the desires, further the interests, or occasion the 
preferred experiences of the valuers 
(ibid, 262). 
Callicott's definitions are very clear and concise, showing precisely the 
character and make up of intrinsic value and demonstrating the possibility of 
such value existing with the full awareness and compliance of the valuers. 
Callicott shows that although intrinsic value itself must exist independently 
within the valuable object, that very existence might have some utilitarian 
value. However, the existence of this utilitarian aspect of intrinsic value is not 
equal to the intrinsic value itself, it is merely an assigned value; the value of 
the intrinsic value. Intrinsic value continues to exist when humans no longer 
value nature inherently because it exists in the valuable object. 
While the exact basis for granting intrinsic value to non-human elements 
of the natural world differs from author to author, most attempts have one 
thing in common; they seek to explain the acceptance of intrinsic value in 
nature as an extension or expansion of the circle of beings and entities to 
which humans have moral obligations. For instance Leopold (1949, 217), 
wrote about a "process of ecological evolution" which he called the ethical 
sequence. He notes that throughout human history, "ethical criteria have 
been extended to many fields of conduct, with corresponding shrinkages in 
those judged by expediency alone" (ibid). Leopold sees the extension of 
ethical consideration to nature, as "an evolutionary possibility and an 
f 
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ecological necessity" (ibid, 218). 
The stances postulated by environmental ethicists might seem 
somewhat controversial. The "evolution of the capacity for empathy" while 
having many precedents, always involves the "acceptance, on the part of 
some individuals, of new obligations, rights, and values which, to a previous 
generation, would have been considered unthinkable" (Godfrey-Smith 1979, 
318). However, despite the theoretical and cultural difficulties, the theory of 
intrinsic value in nature remains ' to be disproven, just as it remains to be 
proven. If Hammond (1985, 168) is right, and intangible value types are as 
legitimate as any other value types, then intrinsic value, by virtue of its 
possible existence and its acceptance by at least some people should be a 
consideration in resource decision-making. 
For the purposes of this project, intrinsic natural values are taken to be 
greatest in the least modified parts of New Zealand. As the level of 
human-induced modification increases, the intrinsic values of the affected 
ecosystems are lost, and replaced with the value of human activity, or with 
values giving utility to humans. The mere entry of humans to these areas will 
not be held to reduce intrinsic values, because humans are seen as being 
intrinsically part of those environments. Instead this reduction begins when 
the landscape no longer "appears to have been affected primarily by the 
forces of nature" (from Department of Lands and Survey and New Zealand 
Forest Service 1980). The impact of introduced biota is not ignored, instead 
intrinsic value is simply seen as residing in greatest quantity in the least 
modified areas. 
f 
CHAPTER 3. NEW,ZEALAND NATIONAL PARKS; 
PRESERV ATION. 
3.1. INTRODUCTION. 
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National parks cannot be all things to all people (Green 1985, 3; Devlin 1980, 
71). If so, what should they be, and to whom? Which of the values oulined 
above as being potentially held for, or existing in protected areas are 
appropriate to be protected and emphasised in national parks? 
This chapter seeks to answer this question, and is in two parts. The first 
part evaluates the history, philosophy and legislation of national parks in New 
Zealand to determine whether they are intended to be a preservation, 
conservation or amenity concept, and to determine what is the intended 
primary management goal of those parks. The second part matches this goal 
to the range of values outlined in Chapter Two. 
That no single park or single type of protected area can be all things to 
all people is critical. fWhere individuals or groups expect to pursue all of their 
recreational needs in one area, conflict can be expected. I "Parks established 
under different legislation go part way towards avoiding this conflict" (Devlin 
1980, 71). The philosophy and legislation of national parks provides a 
specific role for national parks in terms of the spectrum of values outlined in 
Chapter Two. 
3.2. PRESERVATION AS THE PRIMARY MANAGEMENT GOAL 
FOR NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL PARKS. 
National Park philosophy had its beginnings in Yellowstone, in the United 
States in 1872, with the realistaion by a number of early explorers that some 
areas should remain in national ownership, and their natural state, for 
. people's enjoyment. Many countries now have 'national parks' but there is 
great variety in the philosophy and management techniques applied to them. 
Along with Canada and America, New Zealand; 
"share[s] ... perhaps the "purest" form of national park system, 
where the landforms and indigenous biota are protected from 
man-induced change and where any introduced biota is as far 
as possible removed-these areas are freely available for the 
enjoyment and education of all people". 
(Rennison 1972, 8, italics added) 
1 3 
Herein lies the inherent conflict and contradiction of national parks; hojV 
can preservation and free access be reconciled? Some people see some 
levels of use as incompatible with the preservation goal, while others see 
preservation as a barrier to the use goal. Ideas as to which of these two goals 
should have priority, have changed in the one hundred years of our national 
park system's existence, and there has been no complete concensus over 
whether national parks should be primarily preservation areas, or use areas. 
Those who strongly favoured use had ascendancy in the era to approximately 
1950, which Rennison (1972, 6) called the 'national playground' period. 
However, the modern perception of national parks in New Zealand is more of 
parks being a 'biota refuge' (ibid, 9) and, increasingly as a 'psychological 
refuge' (ibid, 10; also implied by Molloy and Wilson 1986). 
Currently, some groups, such as concessionaires, tourist operators, and 
some politicians and user groups are trying to get parks 'opened up' for more 
use and development (Potton 1987, 22). On the other hand, conservationists 
and other user groups are advocating the continued preservation of those 
parks. 
Booth (1986, 1987), notes that a random sample of the Christchurch 
public showed "overwhelming support towards national parks" (1986, 102) 
and that "the theme of preservation first and use second was apparent" (ibid, 
106; 1987, 7). Against the perception of parks noted by Booth, must be put 
the observations of Jefferies (1986, 10). He notes that many visitors to 
Tongariro National Park arrive thinking "that the park environment has 
somehow been placed there solely for their individual enjoyment". Some 
visitors see the park "in the same way as Disneyland, or Kelly Tarlton's 
Underwater World or some similar sideshow" (ibid, 10). 
F 
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The evolution of national park philosophy in New Zealand has been 
generally paralleled by the evolution of national park legislation. Initially 
when visitor numbers were very low, the administration of national parks 
showed "little or no coordination" (Lucas 1969, 4), and legislation was 
"untidy" (Thomson 1976, 4). By 1952 however, with the parks' growing 
importance, the need for a national system of park administration with clear 
goals became apparent. "The National Park Act 1952 laid the foundation for 
a truly "national" system of parks" (Lucas 1969, 4), and the "dual purpose of 
nature conservation and recreation was for the first time made explicit" 
(Thomson 1976, 4). 
Between 1952 and 1964 five more parks were created. Rennison called 
the era to 1961 the era of "park ascendancy", and the period to 1972, when 
he was writing, a period of "testing" in which "nearly all parks [were] subject to 
sometimes irresistible pressures from alien interests, proving legislation 
incapable of protecting park features" (1972, 8). 
The 1952 Act was replaced in 1980. The new Act involved little change 
in the purpose of national parks except that "intrinsic worth" (s.4 (1)) was 
added to "the benefit and enjoyment of the public" (National Parks Act 1952, 
s.3 (1 )), as a reason for preserving areas as national parks. The "benefit and 
enjoyment of the public" also changed slightly, becoming "the benefit, use 
and enjoyment of the public" (National Parks Act 1980, s.4 (1), italics added). 
The 1980 Act also made some administrative changes to the local and 
national coordination of park policies by Quangos, and the preparation of, 
and public involvement in management planning. The 1980 Act also 
provided for the designation of areas within parks as "amenity areas" (s.15), 
in addition to the already existing "special protected areas" (s.12 1980; s.12 
1952), and "wilderness areas" (s.14 1980; s.34 1952). "Each park has its own 
mix of such areas" (National Parks and Reserves Authority 1983, 6). 
Like the 1952 Act, the 1980 Act enshrined the dual, use and 
preservation goals of national parks; 
"clearly the intention of the legislation is that policies should 
be directed to ensuring an appropriate balance between the 
preservation of areas that are integral to New Zealand's 
heritage, and provision for optimum public access to and 
enjoyment of areas that lend themselves to recreational use" 
(National Parks and Reserves Authority 1983, 6) 
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However, the 1980 Act, like its 1952 predecessor, gives 'preservation' priority 
over use and access in one clause; 
"subject to the ... imposition of such conditions and restrictions 
as may be necessary for the preservation of the native plants 
and animals or for the welfare in general of the parks, the 
public shall have freedom of entry and access to the parks" 
(National Parks Act 1980, s.4(2) (e)). 
Despite this clause, the exact intent of the 1980 National Parks Act, that is, 
whether either use or preservation is to be the primary goal of national parks, 
cannot be ascertained. This is because the section of the Act from which the 
above clause comes, (s.4, "Principles to be Applied in National Parks") is 
open to legal interpretation. 
Jefferies (1986, 11) interprets the Act to mean that preservation rather 
than public use and access is the primary goal of the National Parks Act; "the 
Act provides for the 'benefit, use and enjoyment' of park lands and 
acknowledges that the 'public shall have freedom of entry and access to the 
parks' but at all times the Act requires the use provisions to be subject to the 
overriding purpose of 'preserving in perpetuity' " (italics added). It is 
" suggested here also that the preservation goal is actually strengthened in the 
current Act by the inclusion of the "intrinsic worth" clause in section four. 
The potential ambiguity, and lack of legal definition of national park 
legislation in New Zealand is recognised. However, because it explicitly 
subjects the use of, and access to national parks, to the preservation of those 
parks, the legislation will be assumed in this project to reflect the preservation 
part of national park philosophy; the 'biota refuge' rather than the 'national 
playground' concept of parks. On a continuum from preservation through 
conservation to consumption then, national parks will be examined in this 
project as preservation areas, with preservation as the primary goal of their 
management. Which of the values outlined in Chapter Two can this be 
matched to? 
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3.3. PROTECTED AREA VALUES COMPATIBLE WITH NEW 
ZEALAND NATIONAL PARKS. 
The difference between preservation and conservation is sometimes poorly 
understood. Preservation is a word that is used quite loosely and widely 
(Passmore 1974, 101), while" 'conservation' is sometimes so used as to 
I include every form of saving" (Passmore 1974, 73). Passmore makes a very 
clear distinction between the two; "to conserve is to save", but is "only the 
saving of natural resources for later consumption". Preservation is 
"maintain[ing] in their present condition such areas of the earth's surface as 
do not yet bear the obvious marks of man's(sic) handiwork" (ibid, 101). It 
should be noted against Passmore, that conservation is often seen as 
including, or at least not precluding, present use. The fundamental difference 
between preservation and conservation though, is well articulated by him and 
is of greater concern here; preservation is "primarily a saving from rather than 
a -saving for, the saving of species and wilderness from damage or 
destruction" (ibid, 73). 
The distinction that Passmore made led him to distinguish between 
conservationists and preservationists and their motives, and the resource 
va~es they appeal to. To him, conservationists are motivated by the future 
availability of resources, and appeal to instrumental values; whereas 
preservationists are motivated by keeping areas forever untouched by 
humans, and appeal to intrinsic value. Passmore "explicitly equates 
preservation with appeals to intrinsic value" (Norton 1986, 196). He "took it 
as axiomatic that true preservation must rest upon attributions of intrinsic 
value to non-humans" (ibid, 196). 
Few other authors have addressed the conservation, preservation 
distinction, "perhaps because they accept Passmore's reduction" (ibid, 196). 
Certainly Passmore's work is highly regarded and seldom criticised (ibid, 
196). If Passmore was right, and preservation has to be based only on the 
intrinsic values of essentially unmodified landscapes, New Zealand national 
parks, as preservation areas could preserve only intrinsic values. The 
f 
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rationale for national parks would be completely non-anthropocentric. 
However, the effect of Passmore's reduction has been to "choke ... off 
discussion of the diverse motives supporting preservationist policies" (ibid, 
208). Earlier preservationists such as Muir and Leopold "never limited [their] 
advocacy of wilderness preservation to motives derived from non-human 
sources of value" (ibid, 210). While conservationist motives "can be 
characterised fairly straightforwardly as utilitarian" (ibid, 210), preservationist 
motives are not simply non-utilitarian. Non-utilitarianism is sufficient to 
support preservation, but a variety of human-centred motives may also exist 
for preservation. 
For instance, Molloy and Wilson (1986) note a wide variety of individual 
and community benefits (and costs) of wilderness preservation. Leopold, 
apart from doubting whether non-anthropocentrism would carry any weight in 
policy-making (1979, 140), "believed that concern for human interests, if 
broad enough and farsighted enough, is sufficient to support an adequate 
environmental policy" (in Norton 1986, 207) . "The central concern of both 
Darling [1969] and Leopold was not the line between human and non-human 
interests, but the line between "short-term economic" and "non-economic" 
bases for decision-making" (Norton 1986, 207). Leopold equated 'economic 
bases' with profit bases, or what would now be termed commercial bases; 
whereas the modern definition of economic may include many non-market, 
but still utilitarian values, that may be used to justify preservation. 
Leopold's concern with commercial criteria was "that the contribution of 
species without direct commercial uses will be ignored" (Norton 1986, 208). If 
this is so" and New Zealand national parks are primarily preservation areas 
as proposed here, the market values outlined in Chapter Two, if used to 
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maximise resource returns are not compatible with those parks, because 
those values are not able to promote preservation. 
However, not all utilitarian values are incompatible with preservation, 
because, as noted, there are many, widely recognised, utilitarian justifications 
for preservation. Uilitarian values are compatible with New Zealand national 
parks if they are capable of fostering preservation; these are human, 
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non-consumptive values such as aesthetic, scientific, educational, 
recreational, existence and option values. They are the non-market values 
outlined in Chapter Two. Their applicability is subject to a concern that they 
may be integrated into an analysis based upon the same criteria as purely 
market analysis. In this case, they would no longer be appropriate in 
preservationist national parks, because they would exist in a framework 
which promotes the efficient use of resources, which has already been shown 
to be incompatible with such parks. 
So, some utilitarian values are potentially sufficient to justify 
preservationist national parks such as New Zealand's are assumed to be 
here. Molloy and Wilson express caution though; "arguments ... based on self 
interest, or on bargaining between interests are always vulnerable to 
developments which change the perceived balance of benefits and costs 
(1986, 18-19). When human interests are the major consideration in 
decision-making, only "derivative", or "tenuous" value will be assigned to the 
non-human environment (ibid, 20 and 21,). Both they and Norton question 
the adequacy of utilitarian values alone for promoting wilderness 
preservation, especially in the distant future, because those values "do 
not. .. accord with our deepest feelings about wilderness" (ibid, 20). If 
utilitarian arguments for preservation are inadequate then preservation 
"may ... require policies that are not in the long term interests of the human 
species" (Norton 1986, 214). In such policies it is the intrinsic value of 
non-human environments which is the only possible justification for 
preservation. 
3.4. CONCLUSION. 
The values compatible with preservation, the assumed primary management 
goal for New Zealand national parks, are intrinsic values, and those 
non-market values which are dependent upon the maintenance of the parks' 
natural states. Market values, while not usually compatible with preservation, 
may provide some economic justification for preservationist national parks, 
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but only where they are attached to things necessary to enjoy the park, such 
as equipment, rather than to the resources of the park itself. This 'condition' 
also, applies to non-market values, which lose their ability to promote 
preservation if placed in a market-like, income-maximising context. 
No particular value is necessary to justify preservation, except when all 
utilitarian reasons for preservation have disappeared. In this case, intrinsic 
value, which exists whether or not it is appealed to, remains as the only 
possible justification for preservation. 
CHAPTER 4; NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL PARKS; 
CONSERV ATION. 
4.1. INTRODUCTION. 
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Chapter Three examined the uncertain legislation and philosophy of national 
parks, and proposed preservation as the primary, or ideal role of national 
parks in New Zealand. It also matched this role to the range of values 
outlined in Chapter Two. Chapter Four examines the actual, or potential 
outcomes; that is, what role parks are actually playing and what values are 
actually being preserved or emphasised. Whereas Chapter Three proposed 
what should happen in parks, Chapter Four examines what actually does 
happen or may be expected to happen in the near future. On the assumption 
that national parks are primarily preservation areas, Chapter Four assesses 
whether the values that national parks preserve in reality are those which 
they should preserve ideally. 
There are various non-preservationist influences which may act upon 
national parks that have been noted by both New Zealand and overseas 
authors. These influences could become significant in New Zealand. Even in 
this national park centennial year, when the quality of our park system has 
been widely acknowledged and celebrated (see for instance Thom 1987), 
some people are expressing concern. For instance there is concern over the 
rapid growth of tourism in New Zealand, (see for instance Jefferies 1986; 
Potton 1986) and the growing influence of market philosophy (see for 
instance Jefferies 1986; Mark 1987). 
These non-preservationist influences are the subject of this Chapter. 
Although they are assessed individually, the links between each factor are 
made explicit and should not be ignored. The first part of the Chapter 
examines the influences of tourism as an industry. The second part examines 
the influences of market and economic forces, while the third investigates the 
influence of incremental changes in parks, and of park managers themselves. 
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This Chapter is a review of literature rather than a review of actual examples 
of non-preservationist influences in New Zealand national parks. It is 
intended to alert park managers to possible management, philosophical and 
financial problems during a period of significant change in resource 
management and allocation practices, and significant growth in national park 
usage. 
The concluding part of the chapter is similar to that in Chapter Three. It 
matches the actual and potential situation in national parks to the 
preservation-consumption continuum and, in turn, to the range of values 
identified in Chapter Two. This allows the implications of any difference 
between the ideal and actual state of our national parks to be examirted in the 
final Chapter, and possible solutions to be suggested. 
4.2. THE INFLUENCE OF TOURISM. 
The post-1945 change from tourism as a luxury, to tourism as a 
mass-consumption good, has increased the scale of tourism worldwide, and 
led to increased concern about the detrimental environmental and social 
effects of tourism, despite its economic importance. ,Indeed tourism has often 
been studied in terms of its environmental, social and economic impacts (see 
for instance Matheson and Wall 1982), and a considerable literature has 
developed that examines tourism's impacts on the environment. 
The negative environmental impacts of tourism could be split into two 
types; the actual physical impacts such as trampling, erosion, various forms of 
pollution, and overloading of social infrastructure like roads and sewerage 
systems; and longer term deterioration from cumulative impact. The major 
concern here however is with the cumulative impacts. Little work has been 
done on these impacts, but three critical concepts have arisen, and this 
. assessment of the impacts of tourism on national parks wi" draw largely on 
those concepts; 
Firstly, Budowski (1976) postulated three possible states for the 
relationship between tourism interests and conservation advocates. The first 
--------------------------_._-- --- - -
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is a state of co-existence where neither is very highly developed or impinges 
upon the other. This is essentially an ephemeral relationship; with time and 
the further development of tourism and, or environmental concern, this 
co-existence will change to either symbiosis-where tourism and the 
environment benefit mutually, or conflict-where advocates of the two clash. 
Vukonic and Pirjevic (1980) saw the growth of tourism as being limited 
by one or more of the "factors", such as attractions, accommodation and 
transport, mixed into the product being offered. They said that natural 
resources would often be the limiting factor, and a tourism product would only 
be "harmoniously composed" if it did not exceed the capacity of those 
resources. 
Finally, several authors, such as Butler (1980), Cohen (1973), Price 
(1981) and Plog (1973) have looked at tourism in terms of evolutionary cycles 
from small beginnings to mass tourism. They have examined changes that 
occured in impact parameters over the duration of these cycles, and changes 
in the characteristics of tourists, their hosts, and the facilities they use. These 
studies have provided a useful insight into tourist area evolution. While they 
have tended to be applied to social parameters they might also be applied to 
the study of environmental impacts. 
The New Zealand Tourist Council's definition of a domestic tourist is 
merely someone staying for at least one night, somewhere other than their 
usual residential area, while an international tourist is someone spending at 
least 24 hours in New Zealand for pleasure or business (New Zealand Tourist 
Council 1984, 4). Tourists need not take part in any commercial tourist 
activities or products. In that case the environmental impacts of tourists on 
national parks ,may be limited to erosion and trampling, and are likely to be 
compa!ible with national parks, and with the values that may foster 
preservation. The recreational impacts will also be few, because these 
tourists are likely to be "explorers" or "drifters" (Cohen 1973,169) or 
"discoverers" (Plog 1973, in Wall 1982, 189), that is, visitors characteristic of 
recently discovered, or as yet undeveloped destinations. They will probably 
share similar aspirations, and be few in number. The concern here is instead 
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with the impacts caused when destinations are well known, and 
characterised by many built facilities, and when "institutionalised ... tourism" 
brings "organised", and "individual masses" (Cohen 1973, 167-169) to those 
destinations. 
A distinction is made here between tourists and 'free and independent' 
type travellers because the two are so different, and because there is nothing 
inherent in tourism, as defined above by the New Zealand Tourist Council, 
that is incompatible with preservationist national parks. Instead, the 
incompatibility of tourism and such national parks stems from the nature of 
institutionalised, commercial tourism. Therefore, tourism may herein be 
interpreted as meaning commercial tourism, rather than the mere 
phenomenon of 'being away from home'. The latter will be referred to as 'free 
and independent travel', and will not be considered as a non-preservationist 
influence. However, free and independent travel may be a forerunner to 
degrees of tourism which are non-preservationist, and this possibility is 
examined in section 4.4. 
To understand why tourism is likely to cumulatively impact the national 
parks it operates in, it is necessary to realise the inevitability of tourist 
operators wishing to provide facilities to augment the attractiveness of those 
parks and the profitability of tourist services. National parks a.re often tourist 
attractions. Although they are attractive in their natural state, they are usually 
augmented by accommodation and transport facilities such as roads and 
hotels in the creation of a tourist product. This desire to provide tourist 
facilities is noted by several authors (see for instance Butler 1980, 7; Cheng 
1980, 73; Cohen 1973, 170), and is "particularly difficult to curtail" if market 
forces or government policies favour business expansion (Cheng 1980, 73). 
Indeed, "the development of tourist infrastructures has been left largely 
to the interplay of market forces" (Matheson and Wall 1982, 127). These 
forces make the development of destinations 'appear "immediately 
favourable" (Budowski, 1976, 28), but "have failed to ensure that adequate 
attention has been given to environmental and social concerns" (Matheson 
and Wall 1982, 127). Tourism development has tended to be "pulled along" 
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(Vukonic and Pirjevic 1980, 16) by the economic benefits foreseen, whereas 
the socio-environmental costs are somewhat harder to measure, and are not 
borne by the developer. 
Tourism decisions made purely on economic grounds are likely to lead 
to significant and detrimental social and environmental impacts in national 
parks, especially if those parks are intended to be preservation areas. While 
the augmentation of national parks with facilities may improve their 
attractiveness to tourists, and their revenue-generating potential, those 
facilities, the activities they allow tourists to take part in, and the number of 
tourists that they can accommodate, may not be compatible with preservation 
as a land management goal, or with other recreational uses which are 
compatible with that goal. This is because the natural features of a tourism 
ptoduct often "represent its irreplaceable components and ... by their 
quantitative dimensions ... determine and limit growth" (Vukonic and Pirjevic 
1980, 14), particularly if those features have preservation as their primary 
management goal. 
In terms of Budowski's work it seems that New Zealand national parks 
are currently in a co-existence state with tourism, with tourism not very highly 
developed in parks. To some degree though, the relationship could actually 
be called symbiotic, with conservationists using tourism's economic benefits 
as- an argument for conservation (see for instance Smith 1987, 9; Hager 
1985, 7-8), and tourism advocates and others extolling the virtues of tourism 
as a conservative force (see for instance Moore, 1986; Lucas 1985). 
However some caution is also being expressed about the potential impact of 
tourism on national parks (see for instance Jefferies 1986; Potton 1986; 
Lucas 1985). ,-
Whatever the relationship between tourism and national parks, tourism 
in New Zealand is certainly increasing rapidly. International visitor arrivals 
grew by 15.2 percent to 596,995 in the year to 31 March 1985 (Department of 
Statistics 1986, 319), and receipts of overseas currency from tourism more 
than doubled between 1981 and 1985 (ibid, 320). This trend is expected to 
continue, with one million overseas vistors per annum expected by 1990. 
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I Booth (1986, 5) notes that nearly three million people visited New Zealand's 
national parks in 1985, and that this is increasing by approximately ten 
percent per annum. The exact importance of national parks to tourism 
income and employment, and in attracting visitors is not known, although 70 
percent of both domestic and international tourists intend visiting a park on 
their "next holiday" (Henshall 1982, 51). 
In terms of the work of Vukonic and Pirjevic, tourist operators are just 
-beginning to seek to 'mix' accommodation and transport facilities with the 
natural attractions of our parks. While free and independent travellers have 
been visiting national parks since their inception, commercial tourism in New 
Zealand national parks is at an early stage of its development. The work of 
Butler (1980) and others, suggests that tourism may be expected to increase 
rapidly in the near future bringing larger numbers of increasingly facility 
dependent visitors. 
If this assessment of the potential cumulative impact of tourism on 
national parks is correct, the implications for those parks and many of the 
current free and independent park users will be very serious. The 
p1<eservation status of national parks proposed here suggests that tourism 
developments that dramatically increase visitor numbers, and create 
significant new facilities in parks, will be incompatible with those parks and 
the opportunities currenty available there. The persistent argument that 
tourism is a strong force for conserVation does not seem to apply to 
preservation, or the recreational opportunities that accompany the 
preservation status. 
4.3. THE INFLUENCE OF MARKET FORCES. 
As noted in Chapter Two, the philosophy behind market values, and some 
applications of non-market valuation, is not compatible with preservation as a 
land management goal, as proposed here for New Zealand national parks. 
Therefore,- it would seem that if market forces and market-oriented 
approaches to resource allocation are present in, or may become present in 
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our parks, those parks will change from the preservation state to another state 
that is not compatible with their assumed principal goal, or with the needs and 
wishes of those w~o use national parks in their natural state. 
The period since the election of July 1984, has seen radical changes in 
New Zealand's economy and the economic policies of government. The 
. emphasis of these policies has clearly changed to make the economy, and 
the sectors, firms and individuals within it, more responsive to international 
and internal market signals. Treasury has strongly promoted these policies 
out of concern that "the New Zealand economy continues to display one of 
the most lacklustre performances ... in the developed world" (The Treasury 
1984, 103), due to long-run structural problems such as inappropriate 
government interventions, and resistance to adjustment to changes in 
international markets (ibid, 104-107). The Treasury sees a more responsive, 
'market economy' as the "only way to ensure that the country's resources are 
continually being allocated so as to achieve the highest national income 
available" (ibid, 107-8). Treasury is advocating such an economy because 
"most"- policies are ... judged in terms of how well they succeed 
in ... achieve[ing] greater welfare" (ibid, 111), a~d generally, greater welfare is 
more likely to be achieved by "harnessing and supplementing markets ... than 
supressing them" (ibid/ 111). Despite advocating market oriented policies 
strongly, The Treasury does recognise that there will be occasions when 
interventions will be necessary to improve market outcomes, and even when 
a reduction in general efficiency will be justified in order to achieve a more 
equitable outcome (ibid, 112). 
The impetus of The Treasury's advocacy has extended to land use 
policy (see The Treasury 1984a), with a need seen for, the "relative 
profitability" of activities to dictate which should be undertaken (ibid, 12), and 
for subsidies to be removed so that people in businesses may "receive the 
correct price signals as to what was happening in international markets" (ibid, 
77). Finally, a more market market approach has been applied to 
government expenditure and government activities. Douglas (1986, 11) 
suggests that "government trading activities can, and because of their size 
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and importance must, be made to perform better". A major way in which 
"improved public sector performance" has been sought has been to 
"distinguish between the "market" activities of the government and 
"non-market activities" " (The Treasury 1984, 120). 
Conservationsists themselves have welcomed some of the economic 
reforms instituted by the government since 1984. In 1985 for instance, they 
noted that "the alliance in favour of reform [of the Forest Service] consist[ed] of 
the Treasury Ministers and the conservationists" (Joint Campaign on Native 
Forest ~ 985, 5), and conservationists have long advocated the same splitting 
of commercial and non-commercial functions that Treasury has advocated. 
It is suggested here though, that while conservation and market forces 
may be allies-at least some of the time, preservation may not be as 
compatible with market-oriented thinking. National parks have not been 
exemptea from the impetus to manage natural and social reseources 
according to market forces simply because they are now administered by a 
department that has no commercial functions. Instead the Department of 
Conservation, which administers national parks, is now subject to a 
requirement to recover some of its costs by charging users for its services, 
where those users can be readily identified and shown to benefit (Douglas 
1986, 15-16). The grounds for these new policies are that they increase 
"efficiency and equity" (ibid, 16). That is, cost recovery, including user pays, 
"discourages waste", because the market price of government services will 
force people to assess their real need for those services (ibid, 17). Secondly, 
it "raises revenue" and replaces the need for extra taxation, which may 
reduce efficiency (ibid, 18). The implementation of user pays and cost 
recovery is apparently to be carr~d out "wherever possible" (Jefferies 1986, 
11) except perhaps where "not consistent with ... social goals" (Douglas 1986, 
17; also not-ed by The Treasury 1984, 112). 
"The user pays approach ... may be appropriate up to a point" (Mark 
1987, 1). "tt seems reasonable that the user should pay a greater proportion 
of the cost [of national park services] than the non user (Jefferies 1986,11). If 
the requirement for cost recovery is low, it might be met simply by charging for 
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huts, parking, publications and interpretation, and have no impact on the goal 
of preservation, if that is indeed the primary goal of national parks. However, 
both Mark (1987), and Jefferies (1986) raise philosophical doubts about the 
applicability of 'market forces' to national parks. If the requirement for cost 
recovery is very high it may have to be met in such a way that the 
preservation goal is being undermined, such as by 'opening national parks 
up' for concessionaires to provide touristic services. For instance the income 
provided to the West Coast region by visitors to Westland National Park in 
1980, was estimated at $4.2 million (Pearce 1982), but that could have been 
higher if more concessionaires were allowed to operate in the park. 
As the income returned from national parks increases though, so might 
facilities and visitor numbers. By constrast, the amount of unaltered 
environment would decrease, as would the availabliity of recreational 
opportunities associated with that environment. A rate of cost recovery that 
was too high to be achieved without environmental modification could lead to 
preservation as' a goal of national parks being traded off for gains in 
economic efficiency. However, it should be noted that park managers may 
actually choose not to meet cost recovery requirements, and accept reduced 
budgets. This may actually support preservation by preventing facilities or 
publicity being provided. 
Another, potentially non-preservationist influence of market forces, is 
that the user pays philosophy may become the 'user says' philosophy (Mark 
1987, 1). User says may well be dominated by concessionaires and their 
customers rather than preservation advocates such as park managers and 
free and independent wilderness users. As noted in the previous section 
though, the desires of tourism advocates may not be consistent with the 
preservation objective. 
Despite the cOncerns expressed here about the implications of cost 
recovery through user pays, a greater threat to preservation will come if the 
goal of economic efficiency is applied strictly to national parks. As noted 
above, The Treasury cites the need to be adaptive to changing market signals 
by allowing resources to flow to where they can be used most efficiently and 
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to where returns are relatively high (1984a, 12). In Treasury's words 
"ignoring such changes in profitability can only lead to an economic loss to 
the nation" (ibid, 11). If this philosophy is applied to the extreme, especially if 
there is no consideration of non-market and intrinsic values, it follows that the 
best, or most 'economically efficient' land use will be adopted in all areas. 
Nationa! parks are, for most areas, just one of several land use options. 
Other, productive options might include agriculture, mining, forestry or, 
particularly, varying levels ,of commercial tourism. As defenders of areas with 
which market values are proposed to be incompatible, national park 
advocates would stand little chance of proving a park to be the most 
economically efficient use for the land in that park. The existence of a 
national park then, is quite likely to be, in Treasury's words, one of the causes 
of "economic loss to the nation" (ibid, 11). 
One way of alleviating this situation wherein national parks are an 
economio burden, is to allow more tourism products to be operated in those 
parks. However, as noted in the previous section, tourism, and particularly 
the facility-intensive kind of tourism that could justify national parks in terms of 
economic efficiency, is unlikely to be compatible with preservation objectives. 
In summary, there are a number of ways in which market forces are 
becoming more influential in New Zealand national parks. However these 
forces and their underlying income-maximisation philosophy, seem to be 
incapable of allowing the achievement of preservation as a primary objective 
for those parks. If preservation is accepted as the primary objective of 
national parks, and if 'market forces' are not excluded from those parks, the 
parks are likely to fail to meet their primary objective. 
4.4. THE INFLUENCE OF INCREMENTAL CHANGE. 
The increase in visitor numbers and tourism developments in national parks 
is intensifying pressure on those parks. This pressure, in turn seems likely to 
"exacerbate physical degradation of the resource base ... and lead to a 
decrease ... in the quality of [some] peoples' recreational experiences" 
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(Ditwiler 1979, 439). National parks, if they are preservation areas, should 
ideally remain in an unaltered state. However, as popular destination areas 
and ideal areas for tourism developments, they are vulnerable to the 
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influence 0,1 incrementalism which may slowly undermine the preservation 
goal and reduce the availability of some recreational pursuits. 
The kinds of changes introduced to national parks by growing visitor 
numbers and, or increases in tourist facilities are likely to be incremental, 
cumulative and difficult to pinpoint (Cheng 1980, 73). Cheng notes that 
"gradual expansion in the number of tourist services and facilities ... has the 
potential to alter subtly the social environment" (ibid), and to change 
"community values and objectives" (ibid). While Cheng is talking principally 
of social impacts on communities, she also refers to physical impacts, and the 
impacts on national parks may be very similar. In national parks, incremental 
change may lead to a change in the values preserved in national parks, and 
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in the objectives achieved in those parks. 
The most important feature of incremental change though, is not the 
difficulty of observing it or planning for it, but its apparent acceptance by 
people, and its perpetuation. Incremental change is accepted, or at least 
rarely questioned, because individuals and society "are highly adaptable to a 
changing environment provided that the change is slow and ... steady" 
(Barkham 1973, 219). Dustin and McAvoy (1982, 49) also note this "human 
adaptability which enables people to adjust to a progressively lower quality of 
recreation opportunities without loss of satisfaction". 
, Nielson et al (1977) called this phenomenon of the acceptance of 
incremental change the "last settler syndrome". They suggest that first time 
visitors to an area accept the level of development and crowding they 
experience in a recreation setting but may drive out repeat visitors who go 
elsewhere causing the same displacement. These waves of "invasion and 
succession" (Dustin and McAvoy 1982, 52) are difficult to detect, and 
"regardless of the types of recreational opportunities provided the majority of 
recreationalists will be satisfied" (ibid). 
The fact that visitors remain happy might suggest that the last settler 
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syndrome and incremental change would not be a problem. Indeed Wall 
notes that a tourist attraction "can have many capacities", and because "most 
studi'es of visitor satisfactions indicate that visitors have a good time ... , the 
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capacity is not exceeded" (1982, 191). It might also be argued that people do 
not miss what they never knew or that there are plenty of undeveloped areas 
remaining for wilderness experiences (after Dustin and McAvoy 1982, 53). 
However, it is argued here that incrementalism is a very great problem in 
national p~rks, if those parks are primarily preservation areas, because the 
logical conclusion of an inevitable process of invasion and succession of 
new, and more numerous visitors, is the complete replacement of the original 
attraction with something very highly augmented by facilities. So while 
incrementalism might not exceed some of the several possible capacities for 
national park sites, it seems likely to exceed the capacity that is compatible 
with the achievement of the preservation goal. 
In addition, the argument that people will not miss what they do not know 
about takes no account of future recreationists, or of the intrinsic values within 
national parks, both of which are important parts of the preservation goal. 
Finally, scarcity and irreversibility mean that those who demand the 
low-development type recreation opportunities which are compatible with 
preservation, have increasingly few places to have a satisfactory recreational 
experience. A situation may develop where the "last settler" really is the last 
settler; there is nowhere else for that person to go, where their long term 
satisfaction is guaranteed, without the need to change their perception of 
what constitutes a quality experience. 
Although the principle aim of national park managers in New Zealand is 
assumed here to be the preservation of park environments, they are also 
concerned with providing quality recreational experiences. The problem of 
incremental change in national parks is likely to be compounded by those 
managers because, like park visitors, they fail to perceive, or to realise the 
implications of, iocrementai changes. 
National park managers, in seeking to cater for visitors, guage their 
success in providing good recreational opportunities largely by assessing 
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"what a majority of people have been satisfied with in the past" (Dustin and 
McAvoy 1982, 52). However, dissatisfied users tend not to be included in 
surveys because they now accept an increased number of visitors in the old 
setting or have left, possibly impacting other visitors in another setting. In 
addition, Neilson et al note that managers, if they seek to maximise total user 
satisfaction rather than average user satisfaction ~ay promote a level of use 
that is not compatible with some users (1977, 57) and, or with the 
preservation goal. So, if national park managers do not receive any signals 
that the increased development of facilities is not in keeping with national 
park goals, they will "precipitate a further decline in the quality of recreation 
opportunities and environments" by "inadvertently support[ing] the adaptive 
process" (Dustin and McAvoy 1982, 52) of incremental change. 
Like commercial tourist managers, national park managers augment 
attractions with facilities because the provision of more facilities seems to be 
. 
the right decision. Just as it was shown above that tourism is a resource 
development rather than a force for preservation in national parks, so might 
recreation be. This is because of an apparent inability of park managers, to 
recognise and plan for incremental changes, and an "increasing number of 
visitors whose satisfaction is not affected by a progressively lower quality of 
recreational opportunities" (ibid, 54) 
4.5. CONCLUSION. 
This assessment of potentially non-preservationist influences in New Zealand 
national parks is not definitive. There may be other influences which have not 
been investigated, and there are also preservationist influences in parks such 
as the strong New Zealand conservation lobby, a possible "bias towards 
nature" among park managers (Ditwiler 1979, 439), and, as proposed in 
Chapter Three, park legislation itself. A lot of the research material used here 
was from outside of New Zealand and was theoretical in nature. There is a 
need for research into New Zealand examples to be done. 
Notwithstanding this, it is clear that there are a number of influences 
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which have the potential to undermine, or are already undermining, 
preservation as a possible management goal for New Zealand national 
, 
parks. This undermining may also cause the loss of the recreational 
opportunities compatible with that goal. These influences are closely related 
to each other, especially the impetus to incremental change that tourism is 
giving, and the impetus to tourism that market forces are giving. They are 
strong forces, and in the case of tourism and market forces they have highly 
---tangible benefits. By contrast preservation is a weak force with little tangible 
benefit to humans, and sometimes even significant disbenefit. 
The non-preservationist influences acting upon, or with the potential to 
act upon our national parks, are incompatible with the parks' preservation, 
which is proposed in the previous Chapter as the primary goal of national 
park management. They are strongly utilitarian influences which might 
encourage market valuation of national park resources and, or the provision 
of a level 'of facilities for visitors and tourists that was not compatible with the 
parks' preservation. These utilitarian influences are expressions of 
underlying values which are not dependent upon parks remaining in their 
natural state. By contrast, it has been proposed that those utilitarian values 
which are embodied in, and compatible with New Zealand national parks, are 
values held for an essentially unmodified environment. In addition, the 
preservation status embodies some values that are non-utilitarian, and which 
could not be represented if the influences examined here, became dominant 
in national parks. 
The non-preservationist influences outlined here would, if allowed to 
dominate, lead to those parks becoming conservation areas rather than 
preservation areas. In the words of Passmore, parks would be saved for 
human use rather than from human modification. 
CHAPTER 5. PROBLEM ANALYSIS, IMPLICATIONS AND 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. 
5.1. INTRODUCTION. 
"\ 
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New Zealand national parks are increasingly subject to a number of 
conservationist influences. Their popularity and attractiveness for tourism 
developments is increasing, and justification for preservation as a land 
management goal is becoming more difficult in the face of new, more 
market-oriented resource allocation procedures. Another, less obvious 
influence is at work, as both park managers and visitors perpetuate a cycle of 
incremental, apparently justifiable changes to national parks, which 
constantly increase the impact of humans in those parks. 
However, it must be noted that this is more pronounced in some parks 
than in others, and in some parts of parks than in other parts. Similarly, large 
areas of some of our parks still retain their natural character and are still able 
to foster preservation goals. Indeed, it might actually be argued, against the 
findings of this project, that national parks in New Zealand are fulfilling 
preservation goals because they still appear to be largely natural areas. 
Depending upon the definition of preservation an observer uses, this may be 
so, but comparison of areas such as the skifields of Tongariro, the beaches of 
Abel Tasman, the Mount Cook village area, and the Milford Track and Sound 
area, with the more remote areas of Urewera, Aspiring, Arthur's Pass and 
Fiordland National Parks, suggests that there is a vast difference in the 
outcomes being achieved. Even if a broad definition of preservation is 
accepted, the former areas still seem to be conservationist areas where 
preservation, as a land use goal has not been achieved. 
The concern of this project is that in time, even the areas that still have 
preservation potential, will become conservation areas. Preservation seems 
to be a very difficult land management goal to maintain or justify. If the 
assessment of national parks that is presented in the previous Chapter is 
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correct, and non-preservationist influences are becoming significant in 
national parks, those parks will be increasingly unable to meet preservation 
objectives. If these objectives are the primary objectives of national parks, as 
./ 
proposed in Chapter Three, the stewardship of New Zealand's national parks 
will be erring on~he side of conservation. 
5.2. IMPLICATIONS. 
The growth of non-preservationist influences in New Zealand national parks 
will lead to the steady loss of land for preservation. Accompanying this will be 
the loss of some of the intrinsic values existing in national parks, and of any 
utilitarian values that are compatible with the preservation status, such as the 
value of the mere existence of the parks in a natural state, and the value of 
maintain~ng the options associated with that state. Finally, the 
resource-based, non facility-demanding recreational opportunities that can 
only be pursued in a wilderness setting will also be lost. It may be argued 
that the outcome achieved will have other, possibly greater benefits. This is 
true, but this outcome will not be compatible with the preservation status, and 
may well be achievable elsewhere. 
The policy implications of this failure to achieve preservation objectives 
could be addressed in several ways. Firstly, the problem might be attributed 
to the ideal state of national parks that is proposed above as the primary 
intention of park legislation; it could be that this goal is the wrong one for the 
land in question. Secondly, if preservation is accepted as the primary goal of 
the National Parks Act, as in this project, the problem to be addressed will be 
attributed to some part of the process whereby national parks are actually 
administered and managed, and the preservation goal pursued. Thirdly, the 
legislation may be blamed for the difference between ideal and actual 
outcomes, because the confusion of its dual objectives allows no ideal state 
for parks to be discerned. This in turn makes it difficult to judge the rightness 
and wrongness of influences acting upon national parks. 
The view taken here, in keeping with the assumed, ideally 
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preservationist state of national parks, is that preservation, and the intrinsic 
and utilitarian values associated with it, is legitimate as a land management 
goal. The rest of the current Chapter then, will address the impact of 
non-preservationist influences, and the problem of managing national parks 
to achieve preservationist objectives. However, fulfillment of preservationist 
objectives may not be appropriate or possible in the current number or area 
of national parks. So, while the preservation goal is accepted, the possibility 
and appropriateness of its application will be questioned for some areas, as 
will the efficacy of some of its clauses. 
It is important that the failure of national parks to achieve the 
preservation goal be addressed urgently for two reasons. Firstly, the amount 
of land able to be managed for preservation can only decrease while 
non-preservationist influences are not addressed. Secondly, changes to the 
preservatJon state of natural environment are irreversible; "unlike most other 
cultural resources of our society-playing fields, theatre, symphony orchestras, 
ballet companies-wilderness cannot be produced" (Wilson and Molloy 1986, 
17). Preservation is the only land use option which leaves the preservation 
option open (Molloy 1981, 8; Molloy and Wilson 1986, 16), and because of 
this, irreversibility must be a major consideration in addressing possible 
changes to environments that are currently compatible with preservation. 
5.3. ADDRESSING NON-PRESERVATIONIST INFLUENCES. 
Norton notes that, the distinction between the motives of conservationists and 
preservationists might "reflect a difference in theory of value (1986, 198). If 
our national parks are preservation areas as proposed, but our stewardship 
of them is erring on the side of conservation, "New Zealand [may be] lack[ing] 
a clear philosophy of values for its national park management" (Potton 1986, 
25). New Zealanders as a whole need to establish exactly what it is that they 
have national parks for, that is, what management goals and underlying 
values should national park management reflect. If some degree of 
preservation is iqlentified as the intended primary goal of national parks in 
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New Zealand, the compatability of market forces, recreation, tourism with the 
level of preservation envisaged will need to be established. Park 
management will then need to control human impacts in national parks so 
that the desired level of preservation is obtained. 
To ensure 'the achievement of preservation goals "park administrators 
will need to develop a philosophy that recognises the full range of human and 
other values which they are protecting in national parks" (ibid 25), because 
"wilderness protection, [or indeed, the achievement of any other land 
management goal] ultimately rests upon the implementation of a 
management programme that ensures that those values which designation 
originally sought to protect are, in fact, protected" (Stankey 1981, 77). "A 
clearer understanding of the basis of these values can give added support 
and resolve to efforts aimed at preserving" (Hammond, 1985, 196). 
O~e difficulty that preservationists will need to overcome, is that 
preservation, unlike conservation, might not "easily be incorporated within the 
traditional Graeco-Christian [and anthropocentric] view of the world" 
(Passmore 1974, 101, in Norton 1986, 197), because it may be based upon 
non-antropocentric justifications, and, or actually be of disbenefit to people. 
Leopold, writing in the 1920s, also noted the difficulty of giving weight to 
non-antropocentrism in policy making. In addition, preservation and the 
underlying concepts such as intrinsic value are imprecise (Norton 1986, 218). 
However, the modern conservation movement has brought vastly 
increased support to the concept of intrinsic value, and making decisions on 
utilitarian, anthropocentric grounds alone, may not do justice to our intuitions 
(Godfrey-Smith 1979, 319). In addition, although intrinsic value can still not 
be defined or proven, its existence is asserted-allbeit implicitly or intuitively-by 
many authors (e.g. Potton 1986, 25; Godfrey-Smith 1979, 319; Molloy and 
Wilson 1986, 21; Norton, 1986, 214; Rolston 1985, 38; Calicott 1985). 
Appeals to intrinsic value and non-anthropocentrism are as legitimate and 
important as appeals to any other value (Hammond 1985, 168). "We are no 
longer bound to arguing always and only on the basis of human benefit..., on 
which basis the value of the non-human environment will always be 
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derivative and tenuous (Molloy and Wilson 1986, 21) 
The public 'support' for national parks in New Zealand that was 
observed by Booth (198"6) has been noted. However, that support is for parks 
as they are, which, it is asserted here, is different to their ideal, preservation 
state. Would there be so much support for such a large preservation estate? 
"Can we articulate the satisfactions and be~efits of wilderness clearly enough 
to convince people who have not experienced it to support its preservation 
despite any costs involved?" (Molloy and Wilson 1986, 11). One criticism that 
has been made of wilderness and preservation policies, is the elitism they 
engender because of the difficulty of access to wilderness areas. To gain 
acceptance of wilderness as legitimate and worthwhile, managers must 
demonstrate that this criticism "shows very little understanding of the 
wilderness concept" (ibid, 14) and that with easy access wilderness would no 
longer actually be wilderness. 
Stankey called wilderness preservation an activity "counter to the 
predominantly utilitarian values that dominate the world today" (1981, 74). 
National park administrators need to "dispel the ... concern that wilderness 
values are somehow incompatible with civilisation" (Passmore 1974, in 
Hammond, 1985, 169) and to overcome the deeply rooted, human-centred 
tendency which sees converted nature as "something ... more agreeable and 
more intelligible than wilderness" (Passmore 1974, in Hammond 1985, 169, 
also noted by Gunn 1980, 26, and Molloy and Wilson 1986, 20). 
A clear understanding of the values that national parks are intended to 
protect, will also be necessary to overcome the increasing influence of market 
forces. As noted in Chapter Four, The Treasury does envisage occasions 
when a "reduction in general efficiency" will be appropriate or necessary (The 
Treasury 1984, 112; also Douglas 1986, 17). National park administrators 
and advocates must accept that preservation involves "consciously foregoing 
an opportunity for economic growth" (Molloy 1981, 8). As preservation 
advocates they will have to convince The Treasury, and resource policy 
makers generally, that national parks are a worthy exception to the general 
need to promote greater income by efficient resource use. 
.., 
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It will be a "sugstantial job of education" to convince advocates of 
adherence to market forces that "wilderness areas ... are not a deep laid plot 
to lock up land, ... but a desirable mechanism for management" (Lucas 1981, 
48). Preservationists will also need to seek the exemption of national parks 
from cost benefit analyses because, "there is a richer [or wider] value 
spectrum [in national parks] than we(sic) have reason to believe can be 
caught by economic valuation" (Rolston 1985, 38). Indeed, part of the 
justification for preservation is non-anthropocentric, whereas cost-benefit 
analysis reflects "the anthropocentric view that all value ultimately resides in 
human interests and concerns" (Godfrey-Smith 1979, 312; Brown 1984, 231 
provides an example of this human-centred tendency of economics). 
A clear understanding of the goals of national parks and their underlying 
value~, will assist park managers in recognising and dealing with incremental 
change by making its impact on the achievement of preservation more readily 
discernible. National park managers need to fit the demands on them as 
recreation planners, to their role of providing stewardship for preservation 
areas. They "must abandon their reactive habits and replace user satisfaction 
as the[ir] ultimate goal" (Dustin and McAvoy 1982, 54) with a committment to 
fostering recreational opportunities which "protect the integrity and stability of 
the environment in which those opportunities exist" (ibid, 54). Only if the 
recreational opportunities which are compatible with preservation are actively 
managed for, and other activities and commercial tourism excluded, can the 
preservation goal be met. 
This could also satisfy wilderness-type recreationists who lose 
recreation opportunities as preservation areas diminish. Non-preservationist 
influences such as the last settler syndrome and incremental change tend to 
homogenise both environments and the available recreation opportunities, 
but given the diversity of recreation aspirations, "it follows that recreational 
quality is best achieved by maintaining as diverse a system of environmental 
settings as possible (ibid). If recreation is managed in this way the quality of 
that recreation may be judged by "the degree of fit between [the] ... attributes 
[of a recreation setting] ... and the preferences of recreationalists experiencing 
\ 
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them" (ibid), rather than simply by the happiness of a majority of current park 
users. Accepting that no recreation environment will be pleasing to all 
recreationalists will allow "the broadest segment of the public, to find 
satisfying recreational opportunities" (ibid), while still maintaining the 
environments with which those opportunities are compatible. 
5.4. WEAKNESSES IN NATIONAL PARK LEGISLATION. 
As well as a lack of clarity of the values appropriate to the preservation of 
national parks, there are a number of features of national park legislation 
itself which have compounded the difficulty of achieving preservation 
objectives. Both Rennison (1972) and Booth (1986) note that our national 
park system "is unable to defend itself by falling back on the law" (Rennison 
1972, 8). The major problem of existing park legislation is its incorporation of 
dual goals as the "principles to be applied in national parks" (s.4). As noted 
above, neither the preservation, nor the use objective can readily be 
discerned as being the intended primary objective. If preservation is to be the 
primary objective of national park management, this will need to be more 
explicitly stated in the opening section of the Act. For instance, there is 
currently no definition for "preservation" in the National Parks Act, whereas 
the 1987 Conservation Act defines preservation as, "the maintenance, so far 
as is practicable, of ... [a resource's] intrinsic values" (s.2); and section 4(2) (a) 
of the Act states that parks "shall be preserved as far as possible in their 
natural state" (italiCS added). Preservation as a land management goal would 
be better served if the "as far as possible" clause was removed. 
However, even if the opening section of the National Parks Act was 
amended, and made more explicitly preservationist, there are still a number 
of ways in which non-preservationist influences could be legitimised through 
the Act. The fact that park management plans are under continuous review 
(s. 46(1 )), makes the tenability of policies throughout the ten year life of a plan 
vulnerable to incremental decision-making. "'-his is compounded by the 
powers of the Minister of Conservation to permit a wide range of activities in 
q 
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national parks, such as farming and grazing (s.51), roading (s.55), the 
construction and operation of accommodation facilities (s.50), and the 
erection of facilities for electronic communication (s.49 (b)). Section 49(a) 
allows the Minister in "accordance with the management plan" to "permit the 
use of any part of the park for any specified purpose of public recreation". 
While the National Parks Act may be interepreted as giving strong protection 
to the land it applies to, it may also legitimise the very influences that lead to 
parks being unable to achieve the preseNation goal. 
There is one section of the Act which offers stronger protection of the 
land it encompasses than the Act does generally. This is section 14, which 
deals with wilderness areas. It specifies that wilderness areas "shall be kept 
and maintained in a state of nature" s.14(2) (a), and it is clearly intended to 
foster more wilderness-like areas and experiences than the Act as a whole. 
However, as part of a national park, a wilderness area remains subject to the 
above loopholes in the Act generally, that is, Ministerial discretion and the 
uncertainty of management plan policies. More importantly though, the 
wilderness area designation itself is subject to the Minister's discretion, on the 
recommendation of the National Parks Authority, (s.14(1 )). The provisions of 
this section may be stronger, but they only apply "while any area is set apart 
as a wilderness area" (s.14(2), italics added). The rest of the Act might be 
more open to non-preservationist influences, but at least the status itself 
cannot be revoked, "except by Act of Parliament" (s.11 (1 )). 
Although wilderness areas, with some amendment to grant greater 
protection, could offer a better means of achieving preservation goals than 
the National Parks Act generally, Thom (1981, 61) notes that "wilderness ... is 
neither a predominant nor mandatory zoning in national parks". In addition, 
because of the non-preservationist forces outlined above, and the 
irreversibility of their impact, "as time goes on [there are] increasing difficulties 
in zoning wilderness within an established park" (ibid, 60). If wilderness 
deSignation was used more often as a management device in national parks, 
and the loopholes that permit conservationist activities to overcome 
preseNationist goals were closed, national park legislation would be able to 
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fulfill those goals. 
However many parts of existing national parks may no longer have the 
potential to fulfill the preservation objective because of changes that have 
already occured within their boundaries. Apart from the irreversibility of 
changes made to those areas, a major reason for this inability to fulfill 
preservation goals seems to be that these areas are too accessible, and 
popular to remain in their natural state, and to foster recreational 
opportunities compatible with that state. This can again be attributed to a 
failure of the 1980 National Parks ;;,ct. It specifies that parks shall be "areas of 
New Zealand that contain scenery, or natural features so beautiful, unique or 
scientifically important that their preservation is in the national interest" 
(s.4(1 )). This clause in the legislation, plus the reknown of the national park 
status (noted for instance by Hager 1985, 7), and the pUblicity given to 
national parks, has attracted more non-preservationist influences, that is more 
visitors, and tourist operators, than can ideally be accommodated within 
areas that are intended to be preserved in their natural state. Many of the 
areas which have been given national park status then, are perhaps, too 
special, accessible or popular for the assumed, preservationist ideals of that 
status to be maintained. It is notable for instance, that the parks which are 
more ordinary or remote, or not already opened up to large-scale visitation; 
such as Urewera, Arthur's Pass and much of Aspiring and Fiordland National 
Parks, are more wilderness-like in character than the parks which are centred 
on such popular, accessible features as Mount Cook, the Ruapehu skifields, 
the Southern fiords, or the Golden Bay beaches. The evident and potential 
failure to meet preservationist objectives in national park legislation suggests 
not that the objectives of that legislation are inappropriate, but that its 
application has been overambitious and unrealistic, and that the main body of 
the legislation is incompatible with its assumed primary goal. 
., 
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5.5. A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF 
PRESERVATIONIST GOALS. 
What preservation advocates need to do then, in order to facilitate the 
achievement of preservation goals, is promote a piece of legislation which is 
capable of giving greater legal protection to preservation areas. It will then be 
necessary to identify areas which are still suitable for preservation 
management to be applied, and to effect the designation of some of those 
areas under that legislation. If this can be done, it may be possible to achieve 
preservation objectives. However, it may be necessary to redefine existing 
national park boundaries, because of the apparent unsuitability of some 
existing parks for preservation status. In addition, because of the freedom of 
" access associated with the national park status, preservation objectives might 
be more achievable if these new areas are called something other than 
national parks, such as preservation areas or wildernesses. 
Those areas of the existing national parks which could not sustain 
preservation as their primary objective, could remain 'national parks' under 
their existing legislation, although the use goal might be given greater 
emphasis in that legislation. Although these areas would be conservation 
rather than preservation areas, the National Parks Act would still require them 
to be, "as far as possible", natural areas. 
Both the 'new' national parks, and the proposed 'wildernesses' would 
require management systems that could promote the goals intended by their 
designation. Caution would need to be excercised so that "the [wilderness] 
zoning [did not] attract [incompatible] users] while conveying the assumption 
that.. .[the national parks] ... will accept development" (Thom 1981, 60). Strict 
legislation which explicitly embodied the management goals necessary to 
achieve the objectives of designation, and clear advocacy of the values 
appropriate to each type of area would help to achieve this. 
The new system envisaged here would actually involve little change to 
existing national park legislation, or, in some areas, to national park 
management. Instead, it implies changes to the existing boundaries of 
, 
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existing preservation areas, and the explicit separation of preservation and 
use as mangement proirities in legislation. It accepts the reality of pressures 
on currently existing national parks, and of the failure to achieve preservation 
objectives in those parks. In the face of that reality, it recognises the need to 
pursue preservation goals actively, with appropriate legislation, only in areas 
where the natural character of New Zealand, as expressed by essentially 
non-human forces, is still apparent. It is a realistic approach to the 
achievement of land use goals, accepting that "if it is possible to maintain 
areas in a pristine state in the face of population and economic growth, it will 
be necessary to manage other areas for sustained, steady and intense use" 
(Norton 1986, 219). 
, 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION. 
National parks are intended to protect certain values. In New Zealand parks, 
it is proposed that these values are the intrinsic values within those parks, 
and the utilitarian values attached to those parks in their natural state. To 
protect these values, preservation is proposed as the ideal, primary 
management goal. However, a number of non-preservationist influences are 
growing in most national parks in New Zealand, and it seems that if national 
parks are to be accepted as the means of achieving preservation land 
management goals, those goals will, increasingly, not be mel 
The assessment of national parks undertaken in this project, suggests 
that radical, rather than minor changes may be necessary, to ensure that 
somewhere, preservation can be sustained. Preservation advocates should 
understand more fully, the values they seek to protect, and accept the 
existence and validity of other land management goals, and the need to 
ensure their achievement too. Preservation legislation, to truly protect 
preservation-oriented land values, will need to be stronger than it currently is, 
and rigidly applied. However, where irreversibility is present, and more 
use-oriented values are already dominant, preservation land values are not 
realistic. In these cases conservation may be a more realistic management 
goal. 
The need to enact change, not necessarily that change suggested here 
is urgent. National parks, while still largely natural areas, are increasingly 
unlikely to fulfill preservationists' expectations. By the strictest criteria of what 
constitutes preservation, there are few sites left where preservation objectives 
might still be met. 
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